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Of the various devices for the administration of insolvent estates,
most important for the corporate debtor have been receiverships, reor-
ganizations under the Bankruptcy Act, and sometimes, straight bank-
ruptcy. For the smaller debtor common-law compositions, general
assignments, compositions under the Bankruptcy Act, and straight
bankruptcy have been most frequently utilized. In recent years two
tendencies have become strikingly apparent: (i) there is a definite
swing away from the employment of state agencies toward an increas-
ingly exclusive use of devices available under the Federal Bankruptcy
Act; (2) methods of rehabilitating, as distinguished from liquidating,
an insolvent debtor, are being looked to first. Liquidation through
straight bankruptcy is being utilized more often only where rehabilita-
tion seems hopeless.'
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i. Not to be overlooked is, of course, the widespread development in recent years
of "friendly adjustments", which are administered on a nationwide scale by credit
bureaus. The device employed is a round-the-table, extra-legal adjustment between
embarrassed debtors and their creditors. By a careful selection of "honest debtors"
who are often still capable of financial rehabilitation, these credit bureaus have had re-
markable success. They claim a record of achieving larger dividends for creditors than
could be obtained through the medium of bankruptcy. This is achieved (i) by a saving
in administrative expenses, (2) by the use of a permanent staff of experts, and (3) by
an ability to realize more on resale of a debtor's assets than could be obtained in the
"forced sale" which is alleged to be characteristic of bankruptcy. The bureaus also
purport to avoid corrupt, fee-grabbing activities said to be prevalent in bankruptcy
proceedings. The "friendly adjustment" is outside the scope of this paper which is
aimed rather at a discussion of the legal aspects of the evolution of legislative and
judicial devices for the administration of insolvent estates.
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The Chandler Act, revising the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,2 purports
to overhaul and improve the means of rehabilitating debtors by the
addition of chapters entitled "Arrangements". "  Arrangements have
their origin in the common-law devices of compositions and general
assignments. 4 These latter might have enjoyed more frequent use had
they been more widely understood by the bar at large. 5 They may still
have advantages over proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) to describe the evolution
and development of the common-law and state statutory devices, point-
ing out their advantages and disadvantages, and (2) to discover, if
possible, the extent to which these legal tools may continue to be used,
and the extent to which they may be superseded by the arrangement
provisions of the Chandler Act.
Common-law compositions and general assignments possessed the
desirable attributes of cheapness, quickness, and simplicity. They
avoided the stigma of bankruptcy. To creditors they offered larger
dividends than could be obtained in bankruptcy; to debtors, the hope of
financial rehabilitation. Bankruptcy seldom offered eitherY Yet these
common-law devices had certain disadvantages which hampered their
effectiveness and impaired their usefulness.
7
For discussions of the advantages of the "friendly adjustment" over bankruptcy
proceedings, see Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment"
(1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 413; Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates:
A Study of Recent Cases (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 293. In reply to Professor Billig,
see Gamer, On Comparing "Friendly Adjustment" and Bankruptcy (193o) I6 CoRN.
L. Q. 35.
2. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, 52 STAT. 840-940, II U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938),
amending BANKRUPTCy AcT OF 1898, 30 STAT. 544 (1898), II U. S. C. A. (i927).
3. In a rough sense, the Arrangement (and Corporate Reorganization) Chapters
attempt rehabilitation of debtors, as distinct from pure liquidation in straight bank-
ruptcy. BANxRUirCY AcT OF 1938, Cc. X-XIV, 52 STAT. 883-940, I1 U. S. C. A.
§§ 501-ii03 (Supp. 1938). See also J. I. WEiNSTFIN, THE BANE:RUpT Y LAW OF 1938
(938) ; J. B. Weinstein, The Debtor Relief Chapters of the Chandler Act (1938) 5 U.
OF PirnsBuRGH L. REV. I. Corporate reorganizations are beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. See, as to that subject, Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations-Changes Effected
by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (1938) 52 HARy. L. REv. I; Heuston, Corporate
Reorganizations under the Chandler Act (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1199; Levi, Corporate
Reorganization and a Ministry of Justice (1938) 23 MINN. L. RE-. 3.
4. GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 84.
5. General discussions of the subject are rare. See BURRILL, VOLUNTARY AssIGN-
MENTS (6th ed. 1894) ; GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) cc. IX, X.
6. A debtor seldom becomes a bankrupt until he is so hopelessly insolvent as to be
beyond hope of rehabilitation. The expenses of administration in bankruptcy are so
great that dividends to creditors are often little more than trifling in amount. For a
fact-study, see Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendy Adjustment"
(1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 413, 419.
7. Not included herein are the difficulties of discovering concealment of assets and
upsetting fraudulent conveyances made by a debtor. Interest is centered mainly around
the honest debtor seeking a discharge for himself and larger dividends for creditors
than could be obtained through the medium of bankruptcy. If a debtor, under a com-
mon-law composition, granted secret preferences, innocent creditors were permitted to
treat the composition as void, and sue for the balance of their claims. See infra note 33.
Under a common-law assignment, fraudulent conveyances and prior preferences could
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COMMON-LAW GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS
The general assignment at common law was a non-bargaining
transaction, being purely voluntary on the part of the debtor. Hard-
pressed by his creditors, a debtor would transfer legal title to his non-
exempt assets to an assignee in trust for the benefit of the creditors.
Upon liquidating the assets, the assignee would usually distribute the
proceeds among the creditors upon a pro rata basis.
The distinct advantage of this device was that the transfer of legal
title to a third party immediately immunized the assets from attachment
and execution by creditors." In other words, it halted a race by diligent
creditors. All shared alike. It was not subject to attack as a fraudu-
lent conveyance on the ground that it was made to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors.9 The advantages of a pro rata distribution were
considered paramount; the delay to creditors, incidental and de
minimis.10  Since the common-law assignment was a non-bargaining
transaction, it was likewise non-consensual. Objection by creditors was
immaterial and ineffective." That dominion which the common law
gave to a debtor over his property included the power of forcing a
general assignment upon the creditors, whether they liked it or not.12
not be touched by the assignee, whose powers were limited by the deed of assignment.
But a creditor can set aside the fraudulent conveyance under § 9 of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act. See Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 944, 956.
8. Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson, 126 Cal. 43, 58 Pac. 320 (1899); Johnson v.
Sharp, 31 Ohio St. 611 (1877) ; Missimer v. Ebersole, 87 Pa. 1o9 (1878) ; Gillespie v.
Keating, i8o Pa. 150, 36 Atl. 641 (1897). See also RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAws
(1934) § 263, which changed tentative § 284; GLENN, LIQUIDATION (935) §§ 110, 112;
Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 944, 947. See infra notes 69, 70, 71.
9. Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 5o7 (1878) ; GLENN, LIQUiDATION (935) § io6.
i0. "But where its provisions were consistent with an honest purpose to deal fairly
and justly with them,--the deed reserving for the benefit of the debtor or his family no
control over or interest in the property, and imposing no improper restrictions upon its
speedy sale and distribution in satisfaction of the debts,--the consequent temporary
interference with the prosecution by particular creditors of their claims by the ordinary
legal remedies, was regarded at common law as a necessary and unavoidable incident in
the discharge by a debtor of his duty to creditors. . . . Such interference was not
regarded as hindrance and delay, within the meaning of the statutes against fraudulent
conveyances." Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 507, 510 (1878).
On the same question, an English court referred to the assignment as "an act of
duty rather than of fraud", and said, "It seems to me that this conveyance, so far from
being fraudulent, was the most honest act the party could do." Pickstock v. Lyster, 3
M. & S. 371, 375, 376 (K. B. i815), cited and quoted approvingly in Reed v. McIntyre,
sup ra.
ii. Tompkins v. Wheeler, I6 Pet 1o4 (U. S. I842); Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 Johns
Ch. 522 (N. Y. I82O); Brockton Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Schenkman, 146 Misc. 119, 261 N.
Y. Supp. 740 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Hyde v. Olds, 12 Ohio St 59i (i86i). In England and
Massachusetts, however, the assent of creditors is required. Widgery v. Haskell, 5
Mass. i44 (i8og). See (1916) 29 HA'v. L. REV. 449. For a discussion of the rami-
fications of the Massachusetts doctrine, see GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § io8; Hall,
Voluntary Assignments and Insolvency in Massachusetts (0894) 8 HARv. L. REv. 265.
12. "The right of a debtor at common law to devote his whole estate to the satis-
faction of the claims of creditors results, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall declares, 'from
that absolute ownership which every man claims over that which is his own'." Reed
v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 507, 509-510 (1878) ; Brashear v. West, 7 Pet 6o8 (U. S. 1833) ;
Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496 (1875) ; In re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 285, 21o N. W.
836 (1926).
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Parenthetically, that dominion extended beyond the power to make
a general assignment upon a purely pro rata basis. A debtor could
convey all of his assets to one creditor in satisfaction of a claim; he
could make a partial assignment for some creditors, to the exclusion of
others; s13 and he could make a general assignment containing prefer-
ences to favored creditors.14 Others were powerless to attack; they
could only wait in hope that the debtor would subsequently acquire
additional assets.35
For present purposes, however, interest is centered upon the honest
debtor who made a general assignment of all his non-exempt assets for
pro rata distribution among all his creditors. By thus immunizing the
property from attachment, he achieved an economical and speedy means
of paying his creditors. There was, however, one serious defect for the
debtor: since the transaction was non-consensual, it did not operate to
discharge him from the balance of the claims of his creditors. 6 Thus,
if in a particular general assignment, sufficient was realized to pay a
dividend of 4o per cent. to all creditors, they retained claims for 6o per
cent. against the debtor, which might be satisfied out of any subse-
quently acquired non-exempt assets. 17 From the debtor's point of view,
this defect rendered very desirable the development of a device whereby
the creditors would consent to discharge their claims upon receipt of the
40 per cent. dividend, thereby giving the debtor his desired fresh finan-
cial start. The common-law composition, to which reference will next
be made, suggested itself as a possible means of effectuating a discharge.
COMMON-LAW COMPOSITIONS
Unlike the general assignment, a common-law composition was a
consensual, bargaining transaction between a debtor and his creditors.'1
Therefore, an attempted composition lacking the elements of a legally
effective contract, such as offer, acceptance and consideration, was sub-
ject to attack by creditors. 19
13. An assignment is "partial" when it acts upon less than all the debtor's non-
exempt property or when it omits to make all the creditors beneficiaries of the trust.
14. Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 507 (1878) ; Crawford v. Krueger, 201 Pa. 348, 5o
Atl. 931 (i9o2). See GLENN, LIQumATION (1935) § 14.
15. GLENN, LIQUmATIoN (1935) § 117, 121. See Mspra note 8; infra note 17.
16. Howlett v. Mills, 22 IlL. 341 (I859); Little v. Sturgis, 127 Iowa 298, 1o3 N.
W. 205 (19o5) ; Limbocker v. Higenbotham, 52 Kan. 696, 35 Pac. 783 (1894).
17. See cases cited sipra note 16; Allen v. Roosevelt, 14 Wend. 1oo (N. Y. 1835);
Sanborn v. Norton, 59 Tex. 308 (1883).
18. See Wilson v. Samuels, ioo Cal. 514, 518, 35 Pac. 148, 149 (1893) ; Bailey v.
Boyd, 75 Ind. 125, 127 (1881); GLENx, LIQuIDATIoN (I935) §§ 84, 85.
ig. Rosen v. Indiana Flooring Co., 24o Mass. 500, 134 N. E. 247 (1922) ; Sond-
helm v. Scalera, 161 N. Y. Supp. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; Laird v. Campbell, 92 Pa. 470
(I88o); Crawford v. Krueger, 201 Pa. 348, 5o Atl. 931 (19o2) ; Chittenden v. Wood-
bury, 52 Vt. 562 (i88o).
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The usual transaction took the form of an offer by a debtor to pay
his creditors, or such of them as consented, a specified dividend, in
consideration for which they agreed to discharge the balance of their
claims. 20  Of course, if only a single creditor accepted the offer, the
agreement lacked consideration.2 1  However, a properly worded pro-
posal would become binding upon those consenting as soon as two had
manifested their assent.2 2  Difficulties of consideration in such cases
were effectively hurdled by the courts.23
20. Norton v. Clayton Hardware Co., 149 Ala. 248, 43 So. 185 (19o7); Crawford
v. Krueger, 2o Pa. 348, So AtI. 931 (i902); GLENN, LIQUDATION (1935) § 85.
21. Usually, an agreement by one creditor to release his claim if the debtor agrees
to pay a smaller sum in cash is held lacking in consideration, under the frequently crit-
icised rule of Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 6o5 (1884). This rule is applied where the
creditors are dealt with individually and not collectively. Sondhelm v. Scalera, 161
N. Y. SuPP. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Laird v. Campbell, 92 Pa. 470 (188o). However,
adequate consideration might be found in the surrender by the debtor of his privilege
to file a petition in bankruptcy.
22. Generally, an offer of a composition is treated as not requiring the consent of
all the creditors unless expressly so worded. Consequently it becomes binding on as-
senting creditors when two have manifested their acceptances. Norton v. Clayton Hard-
ware Co., 149 Ala. 248, 43 So. 185 (i9o7) ; Farmers' Bank v. Sellers, 167 Ark. 152, 267
S. W. 591 (1g25) ; Laird v. Campbell, 92 Pa. 47o (i88o) ; Crawford v. Krueger, 2o
Pa. 348, 5o At. 931 (1902). But see M. A. Seed Dry-Plate v. Wunderlich, 69 Minn.
288, 72 N. W. 122 (1897). Apparently, in Massachusetts the offer is treated as re-
quiring the assent of all creditors, unless it is expressly worded otherwise. Rosen v.
Indiana Flooring Co., 240 Mass. 500, 134 N. E. 247 (1922).
23. Courts seem to have avoided difficulties of consideration by treating the trans-
action as though all creditors accepted simultaneously. Or the mutual promises, though
technically open to question, have been treated as adequate consideration. "Such an
agreement is not with the debtor only, but between creditors as well, each acting on the
faith of the promises of the others to relinquish a part of his claim; and the benefit
which each class may derive from the mutual concession is the consideration which
sustains the agreement, and makes it an exception to the rule that a creditor is not
bound by an agreement to accept less than the amount of an ascertained debt. . . .
This was not a separate settlement with a separate creditor, but a joint agreement be-
tween them, and a good composition." Crawford v. Krueger, 2oi Pa. 348, 350, 5o Atl.
931, 932-933 (i9o2) ; see also Laird v. Campbell, 92 Pa. 470 (i88o) ; Mellen v. Gold-
smith, 47 Wis. 573, 3 N. W. 592 (1879).
Technical difficulties of accord and satisfaction have also been sidestepped in order
to uphold composition agreements. "The validity of such an agreement does not de-
pend on the technical and strict rules which govern accord and satisfaction, release and
discharge, but upon principles of equity, which treat the violation of or failure to exe-
cute such an agreement as a fraud not only upon the debtor, but more especially upon
the other creditors, who have been lured in by the agreement to relinquish their further
demands, upon the supposition that the debtor would thereby be discharged of the re-
mainder of his debts ...
"Anything I could say in elaboration of this doctrine so authoritatively established
and so tersely expressed by these great masters of the law, might weaken its force, and
it is sufficient further to say that this equitable doctrine has been followed almost uni-
formly by the courts." Mellen v. Goldsmith, 47 Wis. 573, 579, 3 N. W. 592, 593 (1879).
In that case a creditor, having assented to a composition, sued for the balance of his
claim, alleging that the agreement was a mere accord, but the court treated it as an
accord and satisfaction. See also GLEN, LIgUIDAT N (1935) § 9o. But see Note
(1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 77.
Recent efforts have been made to treat "friendly settlements" between creditors
and debtors, designed as "round-the-table" means of rehabilitating debtors and giving
larger dividends to creditors by avoiding the expenses of bankruptcy, as economic prob-
lems, free from legal technicalities. Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for
"Friendly Adjustment" (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 413; Billig, Extra-Jidicial Administra-
tion of Insolvent Estates: A Study of Recent Cases (i93o) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293.
See also Gamer, Ot Cdmparing "Friendly Adjustment" and Bankruptcy (193o) 16
CoRN. L. Q. 35.
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It can be easily seen that the goal of the debtor was to secure the
consent of all his creditors. This obtained, he was discharged from all
his debts, and acquired a fresh start in financial ventures. 24 However,
the assent of substantially all his creditors would often be of distinct
advantage to him.
The common-law composition, then, offered the debtor what a
general assignment could not give-a discharge from unsatisfied lia-
bility. It was simple, quick, and cheap, and it avoided the expense and
delay of bankruptcy administration. Like the common-law general
assignment, however, it had its unfortunate defects. During the period
in which the debtor was attempting to secure the assent of creditors to
a proposed composition, he remained in possession and control of his
property. Diligent creditors, with writs of attachment in hand, might
attack at any time, thereby defeating the purpose of the composition.
Thus the general assignment immunized assets from attachment,
but failed to give the debtor a discharge. The converse was true as to
a common-law composition. Complementing each other, they sug-
gested a combination of the two to achieve both immunization and dis-
charge for the debtor. The success of such attempts will be next
discussed.
COMMON-LAw GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS WITH DISCHARGE
In order to immunize his assets from attachment and to achieve
a release from his debts, a debtor transferred his property to an
assignee, and in the same instrument provided that each creditor who
accepted a dividend should grant a discharge in full to the debtor. The
assent of all creditors would thereby effectuate the debtor's desired end.
Yet there were obvious difficulties. Recalcitrant creditors could
refuse to participate, and, to the extent that they held substantial claims,
could prevent the debtor from achieving his purpose. On the other
hand, several factors operated in favor of the debtor. The assignment
placed the property beyond the reach of non-assenting creditors.25 All
the assets would usually be used in satisfaction of the claims of con-
senting creditors, who, because of their willingness to grant releases,
were preferred in distribution. Non-participating creditors retained
their claims in toto, with the speculative hope of being able to realize
upon them if there were a residue after paying consenting creditors, or
if the debtor should subsequently acquire new assets. 26 The more for-
24. Often the arrangement permitted the debtor to remain in business, paying off
instalments. If the debtor had been a good customer, creditors considered it wise busi-
ness policy to aid him in rehabilitating himself.
25. See supra note S.
26. See supra note 17.
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lorn this hope appeared to be, the greater the incentive for all creditors
to participate in the assignment. It seems hardly arguable that the
dividends to creditors under such a scheme would usually be substan-
tially larger than could be obtained should the debtor elect bankruptcy
as an alternative. Thus, it was of distinct advantage to the creditors
to participate in the general assignment with discharge.
Courts uniformly upheld the validity of common-law compositions,
and of general assignments, when employed separately, provided that
such devices were free from unfair elements, such as fraud.2 7  But the
combined assignment and composition never received such general
judicial benediction. Though the question was never passed on in many
jurisdictions, perhaps a slight majority refused to uphold the validity
of general assignments with discharge.
28
Several reasons were given by the courts for this result. Most
frequently it was said that the device gave the debtor too great a coercive
power over his creditors, leaving the latter with little or no opportunity
to object.29  Since the creditors could not attach the assets, they had to
grant releases or receive nothing. And the debtor's threat of bank-
ruptcy, with correspondingly low dividends, was looked upon with
disfavor.30
The coercion argument is open to serious question. The debtor's
threat of bankruptcy seems hardly objectionable, since he is entitled to
voluntary bankruptcy as a matter of right.31 Nor is the threat being
employed for an improper purpose. The general assignment with dis-
charge achieves the same ends as bankruptcy, namely, liquidation, dis-
tribution and discharge, with a fresh start to the debtor. Since the
assignment would probably result in larger dividends to the creditors
than would bankruptcy, courts should be inclined to foster, rather than
to curb, such advantageous devices. The contrary attitude of the seem-
ing majority seems regrettable almost to the extreme. The coercive
power of the debtor is counterbalanced by the fact that dissenting
27. See supra notes 9, 23.
28. Holding such attempts invalid: Seale v. Vaiden, io Fed. 831 (N. D. Miss.
i88I) ; Nelson v. Harper, 122 Ark. 39, i82 S. W. 519 (i916); Henderson v. Bliss, 8
Ind. ioo (1856); Sperry v. Gallaher, 77 Iowa 107, 41 N. W. 586 (i889); Hubbard v.
McNaughton, 43 Mich. 220, 5 N. W. 293 (i88o) ; Grover v. Wakeman, ix Wend. 187
(N. Y. 1833). See McCord-Norton Shoe Co. v. Brown, i3i Kan. 19, 25, 289 Pac. 417,
42o (I93O) ; Kobler v. Heins, x89 Minn. 213, 215, 248 N. W. 698, 699 (933) ; (1926)
74 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 414; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 6o3, 6o7-608.
29. See mpra note 28; (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. REV. 414; GLENN, LIQUmATIOx
(935) § 119.
3o. The creditors found themselves in a dilemma, having to accept a part payment
as a release of the balance, or to hold the entire claim with little hope of realizing upon
it sometime in the future. As a way out of the dilemma bankruptcy was undesirable to
debtor and creditors alike.
3. BANxRUpTcY Acr oF 1938, §4a, 52 STAT. 845 (1938), I U. S. C. A. §22a
(Supp. 1938).
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creditors may institute involuntary proceedings attacking the general
assignment as an act of bankruptcy.3 2 This latter power suggests more
harm than good. It offers dissenting creditors a means of creating a
nuisance power by which their claims might be bought off, or by which
such creditors might receive secret preferences. 3 If they actually threw
the debtor into bankruptcy, the results, in the form of smaller dividends,
seemed bad for all concerned. The dissenters would have won a Pyrrhic
victory. The situation creates doubts as to whether the general assign-
ment should be continued as an act of bankruptcy.34
Another reason given for refusing to uphold the general assign-
ment with discharge is purely formalistic in character. If the instru-
ment of assignment provided that the residue of assets, after all
assenting creditors had been paid off, should be distributed among non-
assenting creditors, the transaction was held unobjectionable. 35  But if
the residue was to be returned to the debtor himself, the entire scheme
fell.30  Factually, this distinction will not bear up under close scrutiny.
Usually there would be insufficient assets to pay consenting creditors in
full. Consequently the existence of a residue would be rare. A distinc-
tion, causing the entire transaction to rise or fail, and based upon a
contingency rarely existing, is hardly justifiable. And in the rare situa-
tion where a residue is found to exist, the distinction is almost equally
bad. If the agreement provides that the residue be distributed among
dissenting creditors, the latter share pro rata. If, on the other hand,
the residue is returned to the debtor, it would be available to remaining
32. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, § 3a (4), 52 SAT. 844 (1938), II U. S. C. A.
§ 2Ia (4) (Supp. 1938). That creditors have frequently taken advantage of this, see
I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 158-164; I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, REOR-
GANIZATIONS AND ARANGEMENTS (14th ed. soon to be published) § 3.401 et seq.
33. Secret preferences in common-law compositions invalidated the composition as
to innocent creditors: Kullman v. Greenebaum, 92 Cal. 403, 28 Pac. 674 (x89) ; Bur-
gess v. Simpson Groc. Co., 128 Ga. 423, 57 S. E. 717 (1907). See also Huntington v.
Clark, 39 Conn. 540 (1873); Jackson v. Hodges, 24 Md. 468 (1866); Huckins v.
Hunt. 138 Mass. 366 (1885) ; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Blake, I42 N. Y. 404, 37 N. E. 519
(1894).
34. Yet the general assignment has constituted an express act of bankruptcy con-
tinuously since 1898. See BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898, § 3a (4), 30 STAT. 546 (I898), 1I
U. S. C. A. § 2Ia (4) (1927) ; BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1926, § 3a (5), 44 STAT. 663 (1926),
ii U. S. C. A. §2ia (5) (1927); BANKRUPTCY Acr OF 1938, §3a (4), 52 STAT. 844
(x938), ii U. S. C. A. § 2Ia (4) (Supp. 1938). Curiously enough, as to corporate
reorganizations, the Chandler Act provides that a petition under Chapter X against a
corporate debtor is not filed in good faith, and is therefore subject to dismissal, if it
appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would be best subserved in a
pending proceeding in another court: BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, § 146 (4), 52 STAT. 887
(1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 546 (Supp. 1938).
35. Beal Burrow Dry Goods Co. v. Baker, 136 Okla. 278, 277 Pac. 585 (1929);
see also Isaacson v. Davis, 127 Me. 398, I43 AtI. 788 (1928) ; Note (1938) 47 YALE L.
J. 944, 962.
36. Kobler v. Heins, 189 Minn. 213, 248 N. W. 698 (I933) ; Barrett & Co. v. Chil-
ton, 304 Mo. 679, 264 S. W. 8o2 (1924) ; Brekke v. Crewe, 43 S. D. io6, 178 N. W. 146
(1920) ; see Note (1938) 47 ,YALE L. J. 944, 962.
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creditors in a race by the diligent. 37 Such a distinction scarcely justifies
such a radical difference in legal consequences. The common law has
never exhibited any antipathy for races by the diligent where all cred-
itors are contestants ;38 a fortiori it should not wihere the field is limited
to dissenting creditors.
The other view, upholding the validity of a common-law general
assignment with provisions for discharge, is known as the rule of
Brashear v. West."' In that case a Pennsylvania debtor assigned all of
his assets to a trustee, to be liquidated and distributed among the
creditors. The deed of assignment expressly provided that all creditors
who did not, within ninety days, execute a full release of all claims
against the debtor, should not be entitled to share in the proceeds. Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall, though apprehensive about the apparent coercive
power such a scheme gave to the debtor,40 felt bound to follow the law
of Pennsylvania, which upheld the validity of such transactions. 41
Significance is given to the decision when it is understood that at the
time of the transaction there was no federal bankruptcy act.42 Hence,
the threat of bankruptcy did not exist for either the creditors or the
debtor. The coercive power, if any existed, was lodged solely in the
37. Usually, the original assignment included only the debtor's non-exempt prop-
erty. Hence, a surplus of this would be attachable.
38. "Among creditors, the race is to the swift. The first to impress a lien upon the
property of the debtor may satisfy his demand in full, to the exclusion of the less alert.
While statutes have made consistent inroads upon this common-law doctrine, and the
bankruptcy, assignment and recording acts evince an unmistakable public policy in favor
of equality, the rule of the 'race for diligence' stubbornly persists. From the time that
the first rumor of imminent insolvency is spread by the credit bureau, creditors are con-
stantly jockeying for position." Note (1938) 47 YAIE L. J. 944. When a common-
law composition was voidable because of secret preferences, or because of fraudulent
concealment by the debtor, the common law upheld races by the diligent. See cases
cited supra note 33. And in some states, if a statutory assignment is voidable by cred-
itors, the courts permit the same race, instead of bringing about a pro rata distribution.
Stevens v. Mosconi, 5 Colo. App. 484, 39 Pac. 348 (1895) ; De Graw v. King, 28 Minn.
11S, 9 N. W. 636 (1881); Marks, Rothenberg & Co. v. Bradley, 60 Miss. I, IO So. 922
(i8g1) ; Montgomery v. Goodbar, 69 Miss. 333, 13 So. 624 (i8i).
39. 7 Pet. 6o8 (U. S. 1833).
40. "The objection is certainly powerful, that its tendency is to delay creditors. If
there be a surplus, this surplus is placed, in some degree, out of the reach of those who
do not sign the release, and thereby entitle themselves under the deed. The weight of
this argument is felt. But the property is not entirely locked up. A court of equity,
or courts exercising chancery jurisdiction, will compel the execution of the trust; and
decree what may remain to those creditors who have not acceded to the deed. Yet we
are far from being satisfied that, upon general principles, such a deed ought to be sus-
tained." Id. at 615.
41. "But whatever may be the intrinsic weight of this objection, it seems not to
have prevailed in Pennsylvania. The construction which the courts of that state have
put upon the Pennsylvania statute of frauds must be received in the courts of the United
States.
"In Lippincott and Annesby v. Barker, 2 Binney, 174, this question arose, and was
decided, after elaborate argument, in favor of the validity of the deed. This decision
was made in 18o9; and has, we understand, been considered ever since as settled law."
Ibid.
42. The Bankruptcy Act of i8oo was repealed in 18o3. The next one was passed
in 1841. See GLENN, LIQumATION (1935) § 107.
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debtor.43 Yet the device was upheld. Had the case been more generally
followed, the general assignment with discharge might have been more
widely utilized.
It appears, then, that in some jurisdictions this was an available
and efficacious means of liquidating an insolvent estate. 44 Since in the
great bulk of states the question was never passed upon, it is reasonable
to assume that in many of them Brashear v. West would have been
followed. The development, however, took a different direction be-
cause of the introduction of state statutes regulating general assign-
ments. These raised new and different problems. It becomes desirable,
therefore, to turn to a brief study of these enactments, and to discover
their judicial fate.
STATUTORY ASSIGNMENTS
The power of a debtor to make a general assignment was an
incident of his common-law power to control and dispose of his property
pretty much as he saw fit.45 In jurisdictions following Brashear v.
West, this power was extended to permitting the debtor to exact releases
from his creditors as a condition of their right to participate in the
assignment. In jurisdictions holding contrary to Brashear v. West
there was a corresponding curb upon this ius disponendi.
Statutes regulating general assignments, in some respects recog-
nized and protected the debtor's ius disponeudi, merely placing it under
judicial surveillance, somewhat comparable to supervision of a trust
estate."' In other respects they placed definite limitations upon a
debtor's power of disposing of his assets.
47
There were probably two reasons for the widespread enactment
of state assignment statutes. One was to place assignments under
judicial and administrative scrutiny, curbing the debtor's power of
utilizing this device for unfair purposes. That is, the assignments
were regulated by legislation, and the statutes vary in the extent to
43. That is, the debtor, by the assignment, placed his assets beyond the reach of
creditors. Their only alternatives were to participate and grant releases, or stay out
and hope for the debtor to acquire new assets at some later date.
44. (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 414; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 6o3, 6o7-6o8. Cases
following the rule of Brashear v. West are: Isaacson v. Davis, 127 Me. 398, 143 Atl.
788 (1928) ; Beal Burrow Dry Goods Co. v. Baker, 136 Okla. 278, 277 Pac. 585 (1929) ;
Brown Shoe Co. v. Beall, 107 S. W. (2d) 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Joel Bailey
Davis Co. v. Augustus, 105 Va. 843, 54 S. E. 985 (i9o6) ; First State Bank v. Allen,
151 Va. 93, 144 S. E. 474 (1928) ; Fugate v. Allen, 153 Va. 143, 149 S. E. 501 (929);
McMillan v. Holley, 145 Wis. 617, 13o N. W. 455 (I9).
45. See supra note 12.
46. ". . . legislation was passed by most states, not to discourage the making of
such assignments, but by various salutary provisions to safeguard and expedite the ad-
ministration of the insolvent's estate by the assignee in the interest of all the creditors."
Note (938) Wis. L. REv. 302, 304. See Wis. STAT. (i93i) c. 128.
47. Most state statutes now prohibit preferences. For a discussion of provisions of
various state acts, see GLENN, LIQUIDATION (935) § 123; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
944; (933) 20 VA. L. REV. 222.
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which they limit the debtor's ius disponendi.4  The other reason was
at that time more important. At various intervals in American legal
history there has been no federal bankruptcy act.49 During these periods
the administration of insolvent estates was left largely to the control of
the states. Consequently, state legislation was enacted to assume this
function.
These laws were of two general types. The one, suggested by the
repeal of a federal act, substituted a state bankruptcy statute. Such
were usually designated "Insolvency Laws". They have present impor-
tance only insofar as it becomes necessary to distinguish them from
state "Assignment Statutes". 50
A state insolvency act differs in one important respect from a
federal bankruptcy law. The United States Constitution expressly
confers upon Congress authority to pass uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcy. 51 This power is not limited by any provision relating
to impairment of the obligation of contract. In fact, federal bank-
ruptcy acts, in enforcing compulsory discharge of bankrupt debtors,
necessarily impair contractual rights and remedies of creditors. 52  On
the other hand, state legislation is subject to constitutional mandate pro-
hibiting impairment of the obligation of contract. 53  It is, therefore,
impossible for a state statute to force creditors against their will, to
discharge a debtor's obligations upon receipt of a pro rata dividend from
his estate 54 This placed a serious limitation upon the effectiveness of
state insolvency laws. As a result, such statutes usually provided that
all creditors accepting dividends automatically consented to release the
debtor from further obligation. 55 The creditors were privileged to
refuse to participate, retaining their claims against the debtor in toto, in
the hope that he might subsequently acquire valuable assets. This limi-
48. In addition to the succeeding text discussion in this article, see Legis. (1933)
20 VA. L. REv. 222; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 944. See also GLENN, LIQUiDATioN
(935) §§ 115, 123.
49. The Act of i8oo was repealed in 18o3; that of 1841 in 1843, while the Act of
1867 lasted until 1878. The Act of 1898 lasted continuously in effect through 1938,
when it was most recently amended by the Chandler Act.
5o. Though in many instances remaining on the statute books, "Insolvency Laws"
are suspended during the existence of a federal bankruptcy act. International Shoe Co.
v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929); (1938) Wis. L. REv. 302, 303; (933) 42 YALE L. J.
1140, 1142.
51. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
52. The deprive all creditors with provable claims with some exceptions of any
further rights against the discharged debtor. BANKRuPTcY Acr OF 1938, § 17, 52 STAT.
851 (938), ii U. S. C. A. §35 (Supp. 1938).
53. U. S. Cocsr. ART. I, § io (i).
54. Insofar as such a statute is retroactive, it clearly impairs the obligation of con-
tract. It might not be subject to that objection insofar as it operates only in fidturo.
Future creditors may be said to contract subject to statutes existing when the contract
is made.
55. See for example, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39, § 0o0; Tix. RE:V.
Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1935) tit. 12, art. 263.
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tation might, however, in many instances prevent the debtor from ob-
taining a fresh start, free from his existing obligations. The state acts
sometimes provided both voluntary and involuntary proceedings. 50
The other form of state legislation regulates common-law assign-
ments. Differing widely in detail from state to state, these statutes are
difficult to classify. Even today four states have no enactments on the
subject.57 A few others are substantially ineffective, leaving the assign-
ment substantially a common-law enterprise.58
As to formal requirements there is some unanimity. Usually the
assignment must be recorded, notice must be sent to creditors, and
frequently the assignee is required to file a bond.5 9 Other provisions
may require the debtor to file a statement of his assets and liabilities
and a schedule of creditors, and may provide for his examination under
oath.60 Time limits may also be set within which creditors are per-
mitted to file claims. 6 ' Such provisions are aimed at securing adequate
publicity and at the prevention of unfair conduct. They interfere little
or not at all with the debtor's rights. In short, they may be said to be
merely regulatory of the common-law assignment.
Other provisions, however, affect substantive matters and limit
the debtor's ius disponendi. For example, most of the statutes prohibit
preferences.0 2 They vary in the extent to which they require judicial
supervision and control.63  Likewise is there diversity in the powers
given to the assignee to set aside fraudulent conveyances and prefer-
ences. 64  As these substantive requirements increase in number and in
56. See for example, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39, §§ 1, 3i.
57. Louisiana, Maine, Oregon and Wyoming. See Legis. (933) 20 VA. L. REV.
222, 223, n. 9.
58. For a general analysis of the various state statutes, see Legis. (1933) 20 VA.
L. R-v. 222.
59. Id. at 224.
6o. See Note (938) 47 YALE L. J. 944, 957, n. 89.
6I. Id. at 959.
62. Compare Legis. (933) 20 VA. L. REy. 222, 228, with Note (1938) 47 YALE L.
J. 944, 950.
63. "In most states the court plays an important part in the administration
of estates transferred for the benefit of creditors. It is expressly provided in many
statutes that the assignee shall at all times be under the supervision and control of the
court and he may be cited and compelled to abide by the orders of the court. The court
can compel an accounting and is given power to remove the assignee for cause, and
upon the death, resignation or removal of the assignee the court may appoint his suc-
cessor. The court may at any time summon the debtor and force him to submit to an
examination in regard to matters affecting the estate. In some states the court may
authorize the continuance of the debtor's business." Legis. (1933) 20 VA. L. Ray. 222,
227.
64. "Fifteen states . . . therefore confer authority upon a statutory assignee to
regain any transferred or secreted assets which a creditor would be able to recover.
Even if the fraudulently transferred assets already have been recovered by an individual
creditor, the assignee may under the statute step in to recover the property and limit
the levying creditor to a pro rata share. If the assignee is lethargic, any cestui of the
trust may conduct the suit to set aside the conveyance, provided he turns over the incre-
ment to the general estate." Note (938) 47 YALE L. 3. 944, 956-957.
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strictness of control, they place additional limitations upon the debtor's
ius dispoiwndi. And in the same manner they tend to make the assign-
ment look less like the debtor's voluntary act, i. e., less like a common-
law assignment, and more like a mandatory statutory proceeding, i. e.,
more like bankruptcy legislation.0 5
For present consideration, of vital importance are the provisions
relating to discharge. Here again there is considerable variation. 'A
rough generalization, which is admittedly inexact, may be attempted.
Some statutes, by express provision, or by judicial interpretation, permit
the debtor to exact voluntary releases from assenting creditors. 6 These
may be designated as "formal" statutes. Others provide for automatic
discharge by all participating creditors. 7  Such may be called "sub-
stantive" statutes, for they attempt to limit substantive rights of cred-
itors. Since, under the "formal" type, releases are exacted by voluntary
agreement between the debtor and his creditors, the assignment is simi-
lar to a common-law transaction. Thus, it may be said that the assign-
ment derives its force by virtue of the debtor's voluntary act, and not
by means of the statute. The "substantive" type, however, resembles
more closely bankruptcy legislation. It becomes more difficult to say
that the assignment is, as at common law, the debtor's voluntary act.
It becomes easier to say that the entire transaction derives its force from
the statute. The significance of this distinction becomes apparent in
subsequent discussion.
Under assignment statutes the debtor succeeds in immunizing his
assets from attachment.6 Other difficulties, however, prevent his
achieving the desired end of a simple, speedy and inexpensive method
of administering his estate. Those difficulties will be discussed in the
following order: (i) To what extent are the statutes given extra-
territorial effect, making possible complete and unified administration in
a situation where the debtor may have assets and liabilities in jurisdic-
65. Giving the assignee power to avoid fraudulent conveyances and preferences is
comparable to the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy. See BANCRuPTcy AcT OF 1938,
§§6o, 67, 70e, 52 STAT. 869, 875, 879 (1938), I U. S. C. A. §§96, io7, iioe (Supp.
1938). Some state statutes convert an attempted partial assignment into a general as-
signment. See ARiz. REv. CoDE ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1936) § 176; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, i93o) tit. 39, § 2. The recently enacted Wisconsin statute provides for in-
voluntary proceedings in a manner similar to the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Wis. STAT.
(937) § 128.o6. See Note (1938) Wis. L. REv. 302, 3o6. See also supra note 56.
66. See, for example, ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 178; ARK.
DrG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 761o; VA. CoDE ANx. (Michie, 1936) § 5278d. See Haijek
& Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (903), in which a voluntary release
was given and upheld by the court, although the Texas Act of 1883, G. L. vol. 9, P. 352,
provided for an automatic discharge.
67. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 193o) § 267; and see supra note 55.
But it is prudent to obtain a voluntary release from the creditors. See Haijek & Sim-
ecek v. Luck, 96 Te. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (903).
68. Boese v. King, IO8 U. S. 379 (1883) ; Pobreslo v. Boyd, 287 U. S. 518 (933);
Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527 (933); Patty-Joiner & Eubank Co. v. Cummins, 93
Tex. 598, 57 S. W. 566 (900).
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tions other than the one in which the assignment is made; (2) To
what extent, under the statutes, is the debtor prevented from securing
a discharge, both because of unfavorable judicial decisions and the
intervention of the Federal Bankruptcy Act?
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT OF ASSIGNMENT STATUTES
A happy, but little investigated, feature of a common-law general
assignment was that it was given extra-territorial effect.60 The courts
reasoned that since a debtor could voluntarily transfer the title of his
assets, he could transfer legal title to an assignee, even though the
property was located in another jurisdiction. This immunized the
assets, wherever located, from attachment, and made possible a unified,
undisturbed administration of the estate.70 This was considered an
incident of the debtor's isus dispondendi. A minority of jurisdictions
gave extra-territorial effect to an assignment, only if local creditors
were first taken care of, or else permitted local creditors to attach in
spite of the assignment.7
1
Statutory assignments, however, encountered more serious extra-
territorial difficulties. The majority of courts, attaching great impor-
tance to the term "statutory assignments", reasoned that the assignee
received his title, not from the debtor's ius dispondendi but from the
statute. 72 Therefore, for the forum to give effect to the assignment
69. If the assignment complied with the formalities required by the jurisdiction in
which the property was located, the assignee's legal title to the property was recognized
and protected. Coflin v. Kelling, 83 Ky. 649 (1886) ; cf. Pierce v. O'Brien, 129 Mass.
314 (188o). See supra note 8.
70. Stowe v. Belfast Say. Bank, 92 Fed. go (D. Me. I897), aff'd, 92 Fed. 'oo (C.
C. A. Ist, i89g) ; Fenton v. Edwards, 126 Cal. 43, 58 Pac. 320 (1899) ; Coffin v. Kelling,
83 Ky. 649 (1886); Roberts v. Norcross, 69 N. H. 533, 45 Atl. 56o (1898); Law v.
Mills, 18 Pa. 185 (1851). See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1938) 421; GLENN,
LIQUIDATION (1935) § 589; WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAws (3d ed. 195o) § 353 et seq.
See also Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers (1Q932) 45 HARv. L. REv.
429, 462; Sunderland, Foreign Voluntary Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors
(1903) 2 MICH. L. Rzv. 112, 125; Notes (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 328; (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 593; (19o4) 65 L. R. A. 353; (1894) 23 L. R. A. 33.
The immunity from attachment is reinforced by the assignee's taking of actual pos-
session. Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476 (1893) ; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29
(1873).
71. Fox v. Adams, 5 Me. 245 (1828) ; Chafee v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 71 Me. 514
(i88o) ; Heyer v. Alexander, IO8 Ill. 385 (1884); Smith v. Lamson, 184 Ill. 71, 56
N. E. 387 (igoo). See Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 214 (935), cited infra note
94, where Cardozo, J., implies that this is well-settled as the majority rule, and see also
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 263. But the assignee's title is recognized
when he perfects it by taking actual possession. Union Say. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Indianapolis Lounge Co., 20 Ind. App. 325, 47 N. E. 846 (1897). See Woolson v.
Pipher, ioO Ind. 306 (1884); and cf. Pierce v. O'Brien, 129 Mass. 314 (188o) ; Wales
v. Alden, 39 Mass. 245 (1839).
72. "The reason for the distinction is that a voluntary transfer, if valid where made,
ought generally to be valid everywhere, being the exercise of the personal right of the
owner to dispose of his own, while an assignment by operation of law has no legal
operation out of the state in which the law was passed." Cole v. Cunningham, 133
U. S. 107, 129 (1890).
a transfer by legal proceeding possesses less solemnity than one made by
the owner himself . . . ." Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 61o, 622 (U. S. 1872).
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would be to give extra-territorial enforcement to the statute.73  In
refusing so to do, they conceded that they would lend their aid as a
matter of comity.74 But comity would never be extended to the extent
of prejudicing local creditors. 75  Hence, under the majority rule a for-
eign statutory assignment was valid except as against local, creditors.
Consequently, a statutory assignment could not bring about a unified
administration where assets were attached by local creditors in a juris-
diction other than the place where the assignment was made.
The reasoning upon which such a conclusion is based is of ques-
tionable validity. The difficulty grows out of the premise that the
assignment derives its force from the foreign statute rather than from
the debtor's voluntary act.76 To be sure, it has been found that all of
the assignment statutes to some extent limit the manner in which a
debtor may effect a voluntary assignment.7 7  But to say that, because
of minor limitations, the assignment derives its force from the statute
rather than from the debtor's voluntary act, seems unwarranted. It
places an undesirable curb upon the powers of a debtor who seeks hon-
estly to distribute his estate equally among his creditors. 78 In effect,
the statute merely tells the debtor that he may still make an assignment
as at common law, but for the protection of all parties concerned, certain
formalities must be observed in carrying out that assignment. Funda-
73. ". . . whilst the disposition of his movable property by the owner is respected
by the laws of all States everywhere, the laws of any particular State and transfers by
operation of law, have no extraterritorial force which other States will concede, except
by comity." Dissent in Crapo v. Kelly, I6 Wall. 6Io, 642-643 (U. S. 1872). But see
Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. 46o (N. Y. 1820).
74. Comity is a form of interstate courtesy. An enforcement of a statutory assign-
ment by comity is a denial of any legal obligation to do so. Foreign statutory assign-
ments are upheld as against attachments by non-residents. Thompson Co. v. White-
head, i85 Ill. 454, 56 N. E. zio6 (i9oo) ; Covey v. Cutler, 55 Minn. i8, 56 N. W. 255
(893).
These cases should be based upon the constitutional obligation requiring each state
to give full faith and credit to the acts of another state, and not upon comity. In other
words, they are correct in result, but incorrect in reasoning.
75. Happy v. Prickett, 24 Wash. 290, 64 Pac. 528 (igoi) ; Johnson v. Parker, 4
Bush. 149 (Ky. i868) ; cf. Borton v. Brines-Chase Co., 175 Pa. 209, 34 Ati. 597 (1896) ;
Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U. S. 570 (igo) ; Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L.
i (1879) ; Warner v. Jaffray, 96 N. Y. 248 (1884).
In Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U. S. 624 (i899), property located
in Massachusetts, which was assigned in Minnesota under Minnesota "insolvency" stat-
ute, was held attachable by New York creditors. This is a denial, not only of extra-
territorial validity, but also of interstate comity.
76. This fallacy arose in the early cases because assignment statutes were placed
in the same category as state insolvency statutes and state bankruptcy statutes. See
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (i8go), and Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead &
Co., 173 U. S. 624 (1899). No distinction was made between an assignment made by
the debtor, which was regulated by statute, and an insolvency proceeding initiated by
the debtor or his creditors, which involved an assignment by operation of law. See
Note (I939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REy. 328, 332.
77. See discussion .rtpra on "Statutory Assignments".
78. The results of this judicial hostility to statutory assignments is more keenly felt
as, with the passage of time, business enterprises become more interstate in scope and
statutory regulation becomes more prevalent.
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mentally, then, the assignment remains the voluntary act of the
debtor; 79 hence, the desirability of treating the statute as "formal"
rather than as "substantive". As will be subsequently observed, for
purposes of ascertaining the validity of discharge provisions, a majority
of courts have upheld them on the theory that the rights under the
assignment "are contractual and the statute merely regulates the creation
and administration of the trust".80 However some of the same courts
say that a foreign assignment made in accordance with a similar statute
is not entitled to extra-territorial enforcement as far as immunization
of foreign assets is concerned because the assignment is "statutory". 8'
This inconsistency is unfortunate.
Behind the majority rule is the idea that a state has sole power to
administer assets located within its boundaries, to which property the
state has already afforded its protection. 2  In addition is the desire to
favor local creditors.8 3 The rule is subject to two interpretations:
(i) if a statutory assignment made in State A purports to affect prop-
erty in State B, the latter jurisdiction will permit creditors residing
therein to attach the assets, but will not accord the same privilege to
citizens of other states; (2) that State B would permit creditors of all
states to participate. The latter disregards a desire to protect local
creditors, being based only on State B's right to administer assets
located within its boundaries. 84  The first seems clearly a violation of
the equal privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitu-
79. Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 379, i S. W. 168 (1886); Weiss Co. v. Goodrich
Co., 189 Wis. 413, 207 N. W. 956 (1926). See Bolles, The Law Concerning Foreign
Receivers (1gog) i8 YALE L. J. 488, 494. See also Notes (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Ray.
328, 332; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 593, 6oo.
8o. Legis. (1933) 20 VA. L. REv. 222, 223. Under this reasoning the creditor is
prevented by his release from recovering the balance of his claim in the courts of every
state since the lex loci contractus will be applied.
8r. Wisconsin, while upholding its own discharge provisions in its assignment stat-
utes in Hempsted v. Wisconsin Ins. Co. Bank, 78 Wis. 375, 47 N. W. 627 (i89o), has
held a general assignment made voluntarily pursuant to a Minnesota statute providing
for discharges to be inoperative as to Wisconsin property on the ground that it was a
bankruptcy statute. McClure v. Campbell, 71 Wis. 350, 37 N. W. 343 (1888). New
York refused to give extra-territorial effect to an assignment made under the Wiscon-
sin statute on similar grounds. Barth v. Backus, 140 N. Y. 230, 35 N. E. 425 (1893).
Texas courts, however, consistently hold that regulatory assignment statutes are
purely formal. They recognize the foreign assignee's rights in the assigned property.
Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 379, i S. W. 168 (1886). They also enforce discharges
voluntarily given by the creditors in connection with the statutory assignment. Haijek
& Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (1903).
82. Green v. Van Busldrk, 5 Wall. 307 (U. S. i866); Green v. Van Buskirk, 7
Wall. 139 (U. S. i868).
83. See GooDnIcH, CoFLicT OF LAws (2d ed. 1938) 514, for a criticism of this
attitude. The attempt to preserve local assets for local creditors has been quite suc-
cessful in the administration of decedents' and receivership estates.
84. The jurisdiction in which the property is situated affords protection to the
property. This being so, that jurisdiction asserts the right to administer the property,
and to prescribe requirements for its transfer, either voluntarily or involuntarily, by
levy, attachment, etc.
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tion; 85the second is free from that charge. When a state court, in
these cases, expresses a disposition to protect local creditors, it is not
clear which of the above meanings is intended. The constitutional issue
is seldom raised, since local creditors are usually the only ones to
attach.s0
Though the issues of full faith and credit and of equal privileges
and immunities seem to overlap, the United States Supreme Court has
distinguished them. In Clark v. Williard,7 a statutory successor 88 to
an Iowa Corporation had been appointed in that state under a statute
giving him title to the property of the corporation. The corporation
owned property located in Montana. The Supreme Court held that
under the full faith and credit clause, the State of Montana must give
effect to the title of the statutory successor.8 9 However, since the
Montana courts had jurisdiction and control over assets located within
85. A Tennessee statute permitted foreign corporations to do business in Tennessee
on condition that they give resident creditors priority over non-resident creditors in the
distribution of corporate assets in the event of insolvency. This statute was held uncon-
stitutional in Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898) and 176 U. S. 59 (igoo). If
resident creditors are privileged to attach assigned property when non-resident cred-
itors are not, this is equally offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. See Note (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 328.
86. The sharp question of constitutionality would be raised where assigned prop-
erty was attached by a resident creditor and by a non-resident creditor. If there was
any discrimination based on residence, the decision would be a direct violation of the
equal privileges and immunities clause. But the usual case involves a contest between
an attaching creditor and an assignee. Inasmuch as the assignee might not represent
creditors, the constitution would not be violated by the decision, whether it upheld or
vacated the attachment. The violation would be indirect, based on the ride of public
policy which would produce different results depending upon the citizenship or resi-
dence of the attacking creditor. See Note (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 328, 329-330.
87. 292 U. S. 112 (1934), rev'g, Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 94 Mont. 5o8, 23 P.
(2d) 959 (1933), and 294 U. S. 211 (1935), aff'g, Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97
Mont. 5o3, 34 P. (2d) 982 (1934).
88. In accordance with an Iowa statute an Iowa surety Company was dissolved
and Clark was appointed liquidating officer and successor to titles held by the surety
company at the time of its dissolution. The Montana Supreme Court said: "Even
though it be conceded that the appointment of the receiver in the state of Iowa operated
to transfer the property of the defunct surety company to him, such involuntary assign-
ment in aid of a statutory judicial proceeding will not be recognized outside of the juris-
diction of the appointment, where the rights of domestic creditors are involved, if the
receiver has not obtained possession of the property and where the creditors have ob-
tained rights or liens upon the property even after the appointment in the foreign juris-
diction." Mieyr v. Federal Surety Company, 94 Mont. 5o8, 524, 23 P. (2d) 959, 964
(1933). The statutory successor would seem to be comparable to an assignee appointed
under an involuntary statutory proceeding. But cf. infra note 89.
89. "We think the Supreme Court of Montana denied full faith and credit to the
statutes and judicial proceedings of Iowa, in holding, as it did, that the petitioner was
a receiver deriving title through a judicial proceeding, and not through the charter of
its being and the succession there prescribed." Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 121
(1934). "The position of a claimant who has the standing of a statutory successor is
more closely analogous to that of a trustee under a voluntary general assignment for
the benefit of creditors [citations omitted] than to one deriving title under a decree in
insolvency proceedings [citation omitted]. . . .' Id. at 122-123. "Whether there is
in Montana a local policy, expressed in statute or decision, whereby judgments and
attachments have a preference over the title of a charter liquidator is a question as to
which the Supreme Court of that state will speak with ultimate authority. It has not
spoken yet." Id. at 123.
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the state, 90 they were permitted to control the distribution thereof under
a Montana policy of protecting local creditors. 91 This latter phrase is
misleading. If it means that Montana might favor local creditors to
the exclusion of all others, it violates the privileges and immunities
clause. 92 Since, however, no foreign creditors were claiming a share in
the Montana assets, the issue was not squarely raised. The Supreme
Court of Montana, nevertheless, recognized that the assets, under the
rule of Blake v. McClung, could be attached by non-resident, as well as
resident, creditors. 93 It seems highly improbable that the Supreme
Court intended to ignore its earlier decision in Blake v. MCClung.
9 4
This recognition of the superiority of the local policy, under the
majority rule relating to the extra-territorial effect of statutory assign-
ments, renders impossible a unified administration. The difficulties are
comparable to those arising under extra-territorial problems of receiver-
ships.95 The unfortunate results seem firmly imbedded in our federal
go. "Full faith and credit must be given to the decree of the Iowa court and the
statutes of that state in this respect, that Clark was entitled to the property, not as an
ordinary receiver, but as a quasi-assignee of the dissolved corporation by force of stat-
ute entitled of right to defend or sue in its stead in this state [citation omitted]. But
the laws of the state of Iowa do no have extraterritorial force. Rights and remedies
of property are governed by the laws of the state in which it is situated. The statutory
assignment can only be given force in other states on the ground of comity; not by con-
stitutional mandate [citations omitted]." Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co.. 97 Mont. 503,
512, 34 P. (2d) 982, 987 (1934).
But cf. supra note 74. It would seem that extra-territorial effect to the statutory
assignee's title is based not on comity, but on the constitutional mandate of full faith
and credit. However, such recognition is subject to the local policy of permitting the
foreign jurisdiction to administer the assets. See supra note 84.
91. Attaching creditors in Montana were preferred over the Iowa statutory suc-
cessor according to the local policy of Montana. This policy was partly determined by
reciprocity since Iowa would similarly subordinate a Montana statutory assignee. Mieyr
v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 515, 34 P. (2d) 982, 988 (1934).
92. See supra note 85.
93. To satisfy an objection argued on the basis of Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S.
239 (3898), and 176 U. S. 59 (I9oo), the Montana Supreme Court said: "Here, any
creditor, whether resident or not, was free at the time the levy of the execution was
made to secure an attachment against the property of the Federal Surety Company.
There is no denial of any privilege accorded to a Montana creditor to any nonresident
creditor." Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 516, 34 P. (2d) 982, 988 (934).
94. The United States Supreme Court opinion does not refer to the problems of
Blake v. MrcClung. Cardozo, J., said: "If title had been conveyed to an assignee for
the benefit of creditors by a common law assignment or by insolvency proceedings,
claimants in Montana might pursue their suits and remedies in derogation of the assign-
ment when the law or policy of the locality ordained that this result should follow."
Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 214 (935). The local policy may pertain to the
formalities of transfer or attachment and execution, but the policy itself must be consti-
tutional. It must not discriminate among creditors on the basis of residence or citizen-
ship. See Note (1939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REV. 328.
The view of Mr. Justice Cardozo in respect to the extraterritorial effect of a
common-law assignment is the minority view. See supra note 71. The "unimpeach-
able authority" which is cited for the proposition quoted above consists of nine cases
involving two receiverships, four bankruptcy or insolvency statutes, and one assignment
statute. Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29 (873), the only case involving a common-
law assignment upholds the right of the assignee who had taken possession.
95. See Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854). The policy of protecting local
creditors by administering local assets causes delay, expense, and confusion because of
CHANDLER ACT-ASSIGNMENTS AND COMPOSITIONS
system.98 The advantages derived from a recognition of the local
policy rule seem small compared to those resulting from permitting a
completely unified administration. 97  Small harm would be done if the
courts applied to statutory assignments the rule they had developed
regarding common-law assignments. The majority rule makes a statu-
tory assignment a satisfactory device only where it is purely intrastate
in scope.
DISCHARGES UNDER STATUTORY ASSIGNMENTS
Under a common-law general assignment, combined with a
common-law composition, a debtor could obtain a discharge from his
obligations owed to assenting creditors under the rule of Brashear v.
West.98 Further difficulties arose when he attempted to do likewise by
the use of a statutory assignment.
State statutes frequently provide that creditors accepting dividends
under a statutory assignmaent automatically consent to release the debtor
from further liability.99 Since creditors are privileged to refuse to
accept dividends thereunder, and to retain their claims in toto, for what
they might be worth, such statutes were probably not in violation of the
Constitution as impairing the obligation of contract.10 0 Creditors ac-
cepting dividends, having given their assent to a discharge, were not
privileged to object on this ground.10 1
The difficulties of effecting discharges under assignment statutes
become more serious when the Federal Bankruptcy Act intervenes.
the requirement of ancillary appointments. See First, Extraterritoral Powers of Re-
ceivers (1932) 27 ILL. L. Rv. 271; Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receiv-
ers (1932) 45 H. v. L. Rxv. 429; Sabel, Suits by Foreign Receivers (934) 19 Coiur.
L. Q. 442.
96. The Clark v. Williard Cases, 292 U. S. 112 (I934), and 294 U. S. 211 (935),
are firm foundations for the unfortunate local interference with the unified administra-
tion of the assigned estate.
97. A completely unified administration would immunize the assigned assets from
attachment, no matter where located. The statutory assignee could collect all the assets,
liquidate them, and distribute dividends to all creditors pro rata. Local policy may be
asserted, unfortunately, in three ways: (i) the jurisdiction in which the property is
located may prevent the statutory assignee from removing any assets unless the cred-
itors who file claims therein are paid their pro rata share; (2) the jurisdiction in which
the property is located may prevent the assignee from removing any assets until all
creditors who file claims locally are paid in full; (3) the jurisdiction in which the
property is located may permit the property to be subjected to attachments notwith-
standing the prior foreign statutory assignment until it is all consumed or until all claims
are satisfied, the assignee taking the residue.
98. See "Common-law General Assignments with Discharge", supra p. 771.
99. See supra note 55.
ioo. The alteration of the contract obligation results from the assent of the cred-
itor to the debtor's proposal, not from the statutory provisions. See supra pp. 773, 775.
ioi. Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (19o3); First State
Bank v. Allen, I51 Va. 93, 144 S. E. 474 (1928); Fugate v. Allen, 153 Va. 143, 149
S. E. 5Ol (1929) ; cf. National Bank of La Crosse v. Funke, 215 Wis. 541, 255 N. W.
147 (1934). See supra note IOO.
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That law supersedes all state legislation inconsistent therewith.10 2  It
invalidates all state bankruptcy and insolvency acts. 10 3  Proceedings
under the latter are a nullity, and leave the assets of a debtor subject to
immediate attachment. 10 4  This is true even though bankruptcy pro-
ceedings have not been instituted. 0 5 In International Shoe Company v.
Pinkus,10 6 the Supreme Court upheld the right of a creditor to attach
assets of a debtor which the latter was attempting to liquidate through
a state insolvency statute. The Arkansas Act, though labeled an "Insol-




7  It did not, therefore, impair the obligation of contract.' 08
The Supreme Court held that the State Act was superseded by the
Federal Bankruptcy Law.'0 9 Curiously enough, the Arkansas Court
had held that the proceedings were equivalent to a voluntary general
assignment. 110 The Supreme Court's opinion is therefore subject to the
charge that the result depends upon the title appended to the statute by
the state legislature."'
Clearly, state assignment statutes not containing provisions for
discharge are not superseded by the Bankruptcy Act.i 12  Whether
1O2. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929) ; Sturgis v. Crownin-
shield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. i8ig) ; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827);
In re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 21o N. W. 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926). See Notes
(1938) Wis. L. REV. 302; (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1140.
1O3. See supra note 102. The state statutes seem to be superseded only where
inconsistent with the Federal Bankruptcy Act. As to persons not eligible for bank-
ruptcy, they remain in effect under a majority of decisions. For example, since farm-
ers and wage-earners are not subject to involuntary bankruptcy, as to them the state
laws remain in effect. See Williston, The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law upon
State Laws (19o9) 22 HARV. L. REV. 547; Notes (1916) 15 MicH. L. REV. 68, (1931)
15 MINN. L. REv. 582, (1938) Wis. L. REv. 3o2, 3o6-314.
1O4. When there is no federal bankruptcy law, a state insolvency statute is at least
operative locally. A state insolvency statute, superseded by a federal bankruptcy act,
cannot work a transfer by operation of law even on local property. International Shoe
Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929).
105. See supra note 1O4.
io6. 278 U. S. 261 (1929). See Notes (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 519, (1929) 27
MIcE. L. REV. 696. See also (1929) 42 HRV. L. REv. 823, (1932) 8 Wis. L. REV. 282.
107. AR K. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, i919) c. 93, §§ 5885-5893.
io8. See supra notes lOO, 1O.
1O9. ". . . Congress did not intend to give insolvent debtors seeking discharge,
or their creditors seeking to collect claims, choice between the relief provided by the
Bankruptcy Act and that specified in state insolvency laws. States may not pass and
enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide addi-
tional or auxiliary regulations. [Citations omitted.] It is clear that the provisions oi
the Arkansas law governing the distribution of property of insolvents for the payment
of their debts and providing for their discharge, or that otherwise relate to the subject
of bankruptcies, are within the field entered by Congress when it passed the Bankruptcy
Act, and therefore such provisions must be held to have been superseded." Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 265-266 (1929).
11O. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 173 Ark. 316, 319, 292 S. W. 996 (1927).
But Arkansas at that time also had an assignment statute which was purely regulatory.
ARI. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) c. 9, §§ 486-493.
III. The "insolvency statute", however, provided only for voluntary proceedings
so that the only real difference between the two stafutes was the discharge provision.
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) c. 93, § 5885-5893.
112. In Re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 2IO N. W. 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926), a
creditor who had accepted dividends in a proceeding under a state assignment statute
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similar statutes with discharge provisions are superseded remains in
considerable doubt. Upon their validity hinges the future of statutory
general assignments. The doubt involved becomes apparent upon a
brief survey of the pertinent decisions. In Re Tarnowski 113 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that a state assignment statute, in respect
to its discharge provisions, was superseded by the Bankruptcy Act.114
The assignment statute itself, without the discharge provisions, was
upheld. 15  Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held
likewise in Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Company, stating that it
accepted the State court's construction of its statutes."01 No question
of the validity of the discharge provisions was involved. The Pobreslo
case means that a state assignment statute, not containing discharge
provisions, is not superseded by the Bankruptcy Act.
Some inkling of light, as well as more than an inkling of doubt, as
to the present status of an assignment statute with provisions for dis-
charge, was revealed in Johnson v. Star. 7  The debtor made a general
assignment under a Texas statute providing for an automatic discharge
by all creditors accepting dividends." 8 A dissenting creditor attempted
to attach the property in the hands of the assignee, alleging that the
moved to have a discharge granted thereunder set aside. The court held that the as-
signment statute itself remained valid, but the discharge provisions were superseded by
the Bankruptcy Act. This interpretation was follqwed in Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd
Co., 287 U. S. 518 (1933). Discharge provisions of the Pennsylvania statute were
likewise held invalid in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl.
209 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 68o (1934) ; cf. In re McElwain, 296 Fed. 112 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1924).
113. I91 Wis. 279, 21o N. W. 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (r926). Note (1927) 1i MARQ.
L. REv. IOi.
114. See supra note 112.
115. ". . . there can be no doubt that legislation prescribing regulations for the
administration of voluntary assignments constitutes one subject of legislation, while the
discharge of bankrupts constitutes quite another. A voluntary assignment for the ben-
efit of creditors is a personal right inherent in the ownership of property. Such a right
existed at common law independent of statute. The statutes do not confer the right,
but statutes in this country have been enacted for the purpose of regulating the admin-
istration of the estate for the benefit of creditors. The discharge of the bankrupt from
his debts constitutes the very essence of a bankruptcy law. While the administration
of the estate of the bankrupt and the distribution of the proceeds thereof pro rata among
his creditors is a usual, if not a necessary, incident of a bankruptcy law, the discharge of
the debtor from his debts is no part of an assignment law. The winding up and a fair
distribution of the estate of insolvent debtors may arise in various ways, but where
such a proceeding does not result in the discharge of the insolvent debtor, statutes regu-
lating such a proceeding do not conflict in any manner with the bankruptcy law, and it
has been squarely held by the Supreme Court of the United States that such laws are
not superseded by the national Bankruptcy Act. [Citations omitted.] It follows,
therefore, that the features of our voluntary assignment act are separate and distinct
from the discharge features first enacted as ch. 385, Laws of I889. The discharge fea-
tures of the Law of 1889 are superseded by the federal Bankruptcy Act and are still in
force." It re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 285-286, 2IO N. W. 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926).
ii6. 287 U. S. 518 (933). See supra note zI5, and Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd
Co., 210 Wis. 20, 242 N. W. 725 (932).
117. 287 U. S. 527 (1933). See Notes (1933) 32 MIcH. L. REV. 93, (1932) I
TEX. L. REV. 381, (1933) 8 WAsH. L. Ray. i89, (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1140.
Ix8. TEX. REv. Cwv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) tit. 12, a. 263.
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state statute was superseded by the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme
Court, following its ruling in the companion Pobreslo case, adopted the
State Court's interpretation of the statute, and upheld the validity of
the assignment. 119
Johnson v. Star is subject to at least two interpretations. The issue
of the validity of the discharge provisions of the statute was not pre-
cisely involved. The real problem was whether the assignment under
the statute was invalidated by the Bankruptcy Act, rendering the assets
subject to attachment by creditors.12 0  The Supreme Court held that it
was not. The language of the opinion, however, easily lends itself to a
far broader interpretation. It sets out provisions of the statute ver-
batim, including the provisions relating to discharge. 121  It accepts the
state court's interpretation of its statute as being not an "Insolvency
Act", but rather as regulating common-law assignments with discharge,
which are admittedly valid under state law. The Texas court had
upheld discharges given pursuant to statutory assignments, insofar as
no bankruptcy proceedings had intervened to displace the assignments. 122
At most, it may be said that Johnson v. Star contains dictum to the
effect that the Supreme Court will uphold the validity of discharge pro-
visions in a "state assignment statute" if the local court has already
done likewise. 123
In content the insolvency statute involved in International Shoe
Company v. Pinkus was substantially the same as the assignment statute
involved in Johnson v. Star.1' 4 The issues were the same in both cases.
Mr. Justice Butler wrote both opinions, with different results. The
cases seem indistinguishable upon any substantial ground. In the
Pinkus case he seemed to indicate that the discharge provisions of the
"Insolvency Act" rendered the entire statute bad.' 25  In the Johnson
case he felt otherwise. In the latter case he followed the state court's
interpretation of the statute, while in the Pinkus case he disregarded the
uIg. After discussing the Texas cases, the court said, "Accepting as we do that
court's construction of the provisions in question, we are of opinion that they are not
repugnant to the Bankruptcy Act. This case is ruled by our decision in Pobreslo v.
Joseph M. Boyd Company." Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527, 530 (1933).
20. This much litigated assignment was attacked in two different appellate courts
of Texas. One court followed the Pinkus case and upheld the attachment. Johnson v.
Chapman Milling Co., 37 S. W. (2d) 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). The other court
vacated the attachment upon the ground that the assignment was valid although it ad-
mitted that the discharge provisions would be inoperative. Star v. Johnson, 44 S. W.
(2d) 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). The Texas Supreme Court resolved the conflict in
favor of the latter ruling. Johnson v. Star, 47 S. W. (2d) 6o8 (Tex. 1932).
121. Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527, 528 (1933).
122. Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (,903).
123. Two state courts have held that their assignment statutes are superseded by
the Bankruptcy Act. Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. iio, 56 N. E. 363 (19oo) ; Rowe
v. Page, 56 N. H. 19o (1867). See Note (1933) 2o VA. L. REV. 222, 223.
124. See supra notes 1O7, 118.
125. See supra note log.
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fact that the Arkansas court had treated a proceeding under the "insol-
vency statute" just as though the debtor had made a voluntary general
assignment. 126  The only other possible ground for distinction lies in
the fact that the Arkansas law was labeled an "Insolvency Act", while
the Texas statute was labeled an "assignment enactment". It is difficult
to see why such substantial differences in result should depend upon the
name appended to a statute by the legislature.12 7
Until the Supreme Court is called upon to determine squarely
whether discharge provisions in a state assignment statute are super-
seded by the Bankruptcy Act, debtors will proceed thereunder subject
to the risk that the Court will disregard its dictum in Johnson v. Star.
If the dictum be approved, one may expect that the general assignment
will continue as an efficacious device for the administration of insolvent
estates, subject only to the aforementioned difficulties of extra-territorial
administration.
The Court will probably be confronted with the precise issue in
only one situation, which arises most infrequently. If an assignment
has been carried through, a creditor has accepted a dividend, and the
state court has thereupon granted a discharge, any assenting creditor
may thereafter attack the validity of the discharge by suing for the
balance of his claim. In such manner was the question raised in Haijek
& Sinzecek v. Luck.' 2s  The Texas court avoided passing upon the
validity of the automatic discharge provision of the statute. Instead,
it held that since the creditor had given a release, and since such releases
were valid at common law, the creditor was bound regardless of whether
the discharge provisions of the statute were suspended by the Bank-
ruptcy Act. This case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Star.
29
This analysis of Johnson v. Star gives rise to a hope which may be
more than sheer speculation. Apparently a common-law assignment
with a composition providing for releases by consenting creditors is not
superseded by the Bankruptcy Act. 30 So, if a particular state follows
Brashear v. West,13 and if that state will say that a discharge under its
statute is granted just as at common law, the statute may not be super-
126. Mr. Justice Butler recognized the Arkansas court's interpretation of the stat-
ute, but refused to follow it. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 266
(1929).
127. One writer has suggested in effect that under the Pinkus case the transfer of
the assets was dependent upon the decree of the court which acquired jurisdiction by
virtue of the statute, while under an assignment statute title is acquired by virtue of
the debtor's act. See Note (1938) Wis. L. RaV. 302, 303. See also Note (1933) 42
YALE L. J. X140, 1141-II42.
128. 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 3o5 (19o3).
129. See supra note xi9.
130. See Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (903).
31. 7 Pet. 6o8 (U. S. 1833). See supra p. 771.
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seded. In other words, the Haijek case may be a means of upholding
a state assignment statute with discharge provisions. On the other
hand, there is an obstacle in the way of achieving such a result. Many
state assignment statutes provide for an automatic release by all cred-
itors accepting dividends. 132  State courts may thus reason that the
statute replaces common-law assignments, that the discharge is granted
not from the creditor's assent, but rather from the statute, and that this
is repugnant to the Bankruptcy Act.'33 From this interpretation there
seems to be no hope.' 34 But the Texas statute so provided, and the
court in the Haijek case chose to treat it as a mere codification of the
common law, with the discharges granted voluntarily by the creditors.
This last interpretation is more desirable. The statute does merely
codify what the debtor could have validly done at common law.
135
Nonetheless, the cautious debtor will bring himself within the rule of
the Haijek case by securing a voluntary release from each creditor who
accepts a dividend. It is worthy of note that such seems to be the prac-
tice, if not the rule, in Wisconsin, despite the decision in Re Tarnowski,
invalidating the discharge provisions of the state assignment statute.
Thereafter, in National Bank of La Crosse v. Funke,136 a debtor-
corporation made a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors
who therein granted releases. Assenting creditors then sued corporate
officers who were accommodation indorsers of corporate notes. 137  In
holding against the creditors the court necessarily held that the discharge
granted to the corporation under the assignment was valid.3 8
ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE CHANDLER ACT
The Chandler Act,' 39 passed in 1938, effects wholesale changes in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Chapter XI,140 entitled "Arrangements",
132. See supra note 55.
133. See supra note 102.
134. See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 124.
135. For a discussion of this point of view, see id. § 125, pointing out that the gen-
eral assignment with provision for discharge as to assenting creditors has survived the
Bankruptcy Law in England.
136. 215 Wis. 541, 255 N. W. 147 (1934).
137. Under Section 12o of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, a party sec-
ondarily liable is discharged by release of a party primarily liable. See BRANNON,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. by Beutel, 1938) § 120.
138. See supra note 137. Apparently the issue of the validity of the discharge of
the corporation under the assignment was not even litigated. The Virginia Assignment
Statute permits the debtor to insert a discharge provision as to assenting creditors. VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 5278d. The Virginia courts have in effect upheld the
validity of discharges granted in that manner by holding that a surety of the debtor is
thereby released. First Nat. Bank v. Allen, I51 Va. 93, 144 S. E. 474 (1928) ; Frugate
v. Allen, 153 Va. 143, I49 S. E. 501 (1929). See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (I935) § 125;
Note (1933) 20 VA. L. REV. 222, 224.
139. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, 52 STAT. 840-940, II U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938).
140. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, § 301-359, 52 STAT. 905-916, 1i U. S. C. A. § 701-
799 (Supp. 1938). Chapter XII provides for the readjustment of debts secured by the
real property and chattels real of individuals and partnerships. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF
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providing for simplified bankruptcy compositions, may displace, to a
very great extent, extra-bankruptcy assignments.
Since 1898, Section 12 141 of the Bankruptcy Act provided for
compositions thereunder. In theory that section possessed many advan-
tages over a common-law composition. Since the debtor's assets were
in custody of the bankruptcy court, they were immune from attach-
ment. The most desirable feature, however, lay in the fact that the
composition became binding on all creditors when a majority in number
and amount had assented to the composition proposal, and the court
had confirmed it.' 42  The debtor thereby obtained a discharge from his
provable debts, 143 which was difficult under the common-law proceeding.
Nevertheless, common-law compositions continued to flourish, and
Section 12 was practically a dead letter.144  The reasons for this were
not difficult of discovery. In the first place, the debtor made his com-
position offer only after he was before the court as a bankrupt.' 45
Consequently, he was usually so hopelessly insolvent that the composi-
tion offered few advantages over straight bankruptcy liquidation. 46
Secondly, the proceeding was so cumbersome and costly that dividends
were correspondingly reduced.
14
1938, §§401-526, 52 STAT. 916-929, ii U. S. C. A. 8oi-926 (Supp. 1938). Chapter
XIII provides for the readjustment of debts of wage earners. BANKRUPTcY AcT op
1938, §§ 6oi-686, 52 STAT. 930-938, 1I U. S. C. A. §§ iooi-io86 (Supp. 1938).
141. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF I898, § 12, 30 STAT. 549 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § 30
(1927).
142. "If the judge was satisfied that the composition was for the best interests of
the creditors, that the bankrupt had not been guilty of any act or failed to perform any
duty which would bar his discharge, and that the offer and its acceptance were in good
faith and had not been made or procured by any means, promises or acts forbidden by
the Bankruptcy Act, the judge could confirm the composition, provided it was accepted
in writing by a majority in number and amount of all creditors whose claims had been
allowed and the amount necessary to pay priority claims and costs had been deposited."
J. B. Weinstein, mtpra note 3, at 14. See also it re Spiller, 230 Fed. 490 (D. Mass.
1916).
143. Section I4c of the Act of z898 specifically provided that the confirmation of a
composition should discharge the bankrupt from his provable debts. BANKRUPTCY ACT
OF 1898, §14c, 30 STAT. 550 (I898), II U. S. C. A. §32c (1927).
144. Proceedings under § 12 were few in number.
145. Section 12a read: "A bankrupt may offer, either before or after adjudication,
terms of composition to his creditors after, but not before, he has been examined in
open court, or at a meeting of his creditors, and has filed in court the schedule of his
property and list of his creditors required to be filed by bankrupts." BANKRUPTCY ACT
OF 1898, § 12a, 30 STAT. 549 (1898), II U. S. C. A. §30 (1927). This delay was not
conducive to rehabilitation of a debtor.
146. Though it seems that a solvent debtor may file a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy, he would seldom do so. In re Foster Paint & Varnish Co., 21o Fed. 652 (E.
D. Pa. 1914).
147. For example, the referee had only the powers of a special master. As a result,
disputed matters were shuttled back and forth between referee and judge, with great
delay and expense. Nor could the debtor make use of acceptances obtained from cred-
itors in a previously attempted common-law composition. For a penetrating fact study
of the cumbersome, expensive procedure under § 12, see DONOVAN, A REPORT ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPT ESTATES (1930) 24, 25, 114-120. See also J. I. WEIN-
STEiN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 12; J. B. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 14.
788 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In 1933, Section 74 was added in an attempt to popularize bank-
ruptcy compositions.148 Some overlapping and confusion resulted from
the fact that Section 12 was not repealed. 149  Although Section 74
simplified the procedure to some extent,150 it was not widely used be-
cause of the attempt to affect secured claims, and for various other
reasons.
151
Under the Chandler Act both Sections 12 and 74 are expressly
repealed. In their place is Chapter XI, entitled "Arrangements".
52
The aim of the draftsmen is to make this chapter a desirable means of
effectuating a bankruptcy composition. The attempt is to simplify and
speed up the procedure, and to lessen administrative expenses.' 53 A
minute analysis of the provisions is beyond the scope of this article. A
skeleton survey of appropriate provisions, however, may shed some
light upon the question of whether the Arrangement Chapter will render
obsolete extra-bankruptcy assignments.
Under Chapter XI a debtor may file his petition as soon as he is
unable to meet his obligations as they mature, even though, in the bank-
ruptcy sense, he may be solvent.' 54 At this earlier period dividends to
creditors should be larger, and there is greater hope of rehabilitation to
the debtor. 155 During the proceedings the debtor may be kept in pos-
session and operation of his business, keeping alive its going-concern
148. 47 STAT. 1467 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 922, 923 (1934), as amended, 49
STAT. 246 (1935).
149. Under § 12, a corporation was eligible to attempt a composition, while cor-
porations were excluded from § 74. Individuals could come under either.
15o. The debtor under § 74 could file an original petition, whereas under § 12, he
must have been first before the court in a pending bankruptcy proceeding. See supra
note 145. Section 74 also enlarged the powers of a referee. Cf. mtpra note 147.
151. The attempt was to affect secured creditors as to extension proposals only.
For examples of difficulties arising thereunder, see In re Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1935) ; J. I. WEiNSTEIN, op. cit. spra note 3, at 259-261; J. B. Weinstein,
supra note 3, at 15-i6.
152. See supra note 140.
153. For example, the debtor presents his plan of arrangement and a statement of
his affairs with his petition, 22 323, 324, and the referee is given extended powers, § 331.
Other attempts at simplification and speeding up of the procedure become apparent in
the text of this article. See generally J. I. WEiNsTEiN, op. cit. mupra note 3, c. XI.
Speeding up the proceedure should result in economy, as should the fact that the debtor
is privileged to negotiate with his creditors prior to filing a petition. See infra p. 789.
154. Section 323 says, "A petition filed under this chapter shall state that the
debtor is insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature. . . 2' BANKRUPTCY
AcT OF 1938, § 323, 52 STAT. 9o7, II U. S. C. A. § 723 (Supp. 1938). That is, the
debtor may be insolvent in either the equity or the bankruptcy sense. Insolvency in the
bankruptcy sense as defined in § i (ig) of the Chandler Act means that the aggregate
of the debtor's property ". . . shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to
pay his debts". BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, § 1 (19), 52 STAT. 841, 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 1 (19) (Supp. 1938). Insolvency in the equity sense means mere inability to pay
debts as they mature, although the debtor's assets may be in excess of his liabilities.
155. Since his assets may exceed his liabilities, there is more property available to
creditors. The debtor may work out an extension with his creditors under Chapter XI,
H§3o6 (1), 357 (3), 52 STAT. 9o6, 910, ii U. S. C. A. H27o6 (1), 757 (3) (Supp.
1938). By thus stalling off his creditors, he may be placed once more on a sound
financial basis. See also J. B. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 17.
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value and aiding him to earn dividends for his creditors. 15 But as soon
as he files his petition, his property, wherever located, is in custodia
legis, and therefore free from the claims of creditors. 157 Thus, diffi-
culties of extra-territorial administration, characteristic of statutory
assignments, are eliminated in proceedings under Chapter XI. To that
extent, then, the arrangement provisions of the Chandler Act offer a
distinct advantage over assignment statutes.' 58
The debtor files his plan of composition with his petition.'59 As
soon as it has been approved by a majority in number and amount of
creditors, and has been confirmed by the court, the plan becomes binding
upon all creditors, the debtor then receiving a bankruptcy discharge.' 60
Such, in brief, is the procedure to be followed under Chapter XI.
Other provisions, however, offer additional flexibility. The debtor is
permitted to secure acceptances from his creditors prior to the filing of
his petition.'"' Thus, he may attempt a common-law composition. If
successful in securing the consent of all creditors, he files a petition
under Chapter XI and secures a confirmation and discharge without
formal application and hearing.'02 Failing to secure unanimous con-
sent, he may nonetheless file a petition and have the plan approved as
soon as a majority in number and amount have assented. 1 3  It then
becomes binding upon all creditors. 0 4 In the latter instance, however,
a formal application for the court's approval is required.' 0 5 Upon
confirmation of the plan, the debtor receives a discharge from all of his
creditors by virtue of the Act.'0  This control over dissenting creditors
156. The court may permit the debtor to remain in possession, or may appoint a
receiver or trustee. §§ 342, 343, 52 STAT. 909, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 742, 743 (Supp. 1938).
The arrangement plan may also provide that the business be operated subject to the
control of a creditors' committee. § 357 (5), 52 STAT. 911, II U. S. C. A. § 757 (5)
(Supp. 1938).
157. §§ 311, 312, 52 STAT. 906, ii U. S. C. A. §§ 711, 712 (Supp. 1938). And by
virtue of § 314, the court may enjoin the commencement or continuation of proceedings
to enforce liens upon the property of the debtor. 52 STAT. 907, 11 U. S. C. A. § 714
(Supp. 1938). See infra note 172.
158. Though the filing of a petition under Chapter XI immunizes the debtor's as-
sets, wherever located, from attachment, the court wherein the proceedings are brought
probably may not proceed extra-territorially to enforce claims held by the debtor
against third parties. Cf. FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1937)
177-187.
159. See supra note 153. Since this gives creditors early knowledge of what the
debtor seeks to accomplish, the hope is that the proceeding will thereupon be speeded
up. A meeting of creditors is promptly called. A copy of the proposed arrange-
ment accompanies the notice of meeting. §§ 334, 335, 52 STAT. 908, 11 U. S. C. A.
§§ 734, 735 (Supp. 1938).
i6o. §§ 362, 366, 371, 52 STAT. 911, 912, I1 U. S. C. A. §§ 762, 766, 771 (Supp.
1938).
161. § 336 (4), 52 STAT. 908, 11 U. S. C. A. § 736 (4) (Supp. 1938). This was
not permitted under § 12. See supra note 147.
162. § 361, 52 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. A. § 761 (Supp. 1938).
163. § 362, 52 STAT. 911, n1 U. S. C. A. § 762 (Supp. 1938).
164. §367 (I), 52 STAT. 912, n1 U. S. C. A. §767 (1) (Supp. 1938).
165. § 362, 52 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. A. § 762 (Supp. 1938).
166. § 371, 52 STAT. 912, ii U. S. C. A. § 771 (Supp. 1938).
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gives the debtor an advantage which could not have been acquired in
extra-bankruptcy assignments.
167
This simple procedure, with its distinct advantages, suggests the
demise of statutory assignments and common-law compositions. Those
desirable attributes, however, may prove to be more apparent than real.
There is reason to suspect that difficulties of interpretation and admin-
istration will arise which will give renewed life to extra-bankruptcy
assignments and compositions.
In the first place, Chapter XI is pregnant with ambiguities. Cred-
itors may be divided into classes, but no basis for classification is indi-
cated. 16 If a plan attempts to treat loan creditors upon a more favor-
able basis than mercantile creditors, litigation and delay may result.
Also, it is difficult to ascertain what claims are considered "provable".'0 9
And if a corporation attempts an arrangement, no specific provision is
made for reorganization, or for the protection of stockholders. 7° These
ambiguities suggest expense, complications, and delay, not economy,
simplicity, and speed.
167. It is to be remembered that under statutory assignments, common-law assign-
ments, and compositions, dissenting creditors were privileged to refuse to participate,
retaining their claims in toto.
168. "For the purposes of the arrangement and its acceptance, the court may fix
the division of creditors into classes and, in the event of controversy, the court shall
after hearing upon notice summarily determine such controversy." § 351, 52 STAT. 909,
ii U. S. C. A. § 751 (Supp. 1938). While such classifications have apparently been
common in "friendly adjustments", see supra note i, the fact that no basis for classifi-
cation is set out in the Act gives promise of controversy. Despite the summary process
provided for in § 351, such disputes will be time consuming and expensive. Explaining
this section, Mr. J. I. Weinstein (op. cit. supra note 3, at 276) writes, "Small claims,
bank claims, service claims and merchandise claims may be grouped in separate classes,
and, if fair and equitable, the terms of settlement with each class may be different. For
example, claims under $ioo may be paid in full or ahead of other unsecured debts, or
borrowed money claims may be deferred in payment to merchandise claims, or service
claims not entitled to priority may be paid immediately and in full."
Section 362 provides that where creditors have been divided into classes, accept-
ances by a majority in number and amount of each class are required for confirmation
of the arrangement plan. 52 STAT. 911, II U. S. C. A. § 762 (Supp. 1938).
i69. "'Creditors' shall include the holders of all unsecured debts, demands, or
claims of whatever character against a debtor, whether or not provable as debts under
Section 63 of this Act and whether liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent. .. ."
§ 307 I), 52 STAT. 906, II U. S. C. A. § 707 (i) (Supp. 1938). This definition applies
to an extension agreement only. As to other arrangements, apparently claims are
provable as in straight bankruptcy. See c. XI, § 302, 52 STAT. 905, II U. S. C. A. § 702
(Supp. 1938). Cf. c. X, § io6 (4), 52 STAT. 883, II U. S. C. A. § 5o6 (Supp. 1938),
for the definition of "creditor" in corporate reorganization proceedings, and § I (II), 52
STAT. 841, II U. S. C. A. § i (ii) (Supp. 1938), as to straight bankruptcy. Although
corporations are eligible to proceed under Chapter XI, § 3o6 (3), 52 STAT. 9O6, II U. S.
C. A. § 7o6 (3) (Supp. 1938), and § 146 (2), 52 STAT. 887, II U. S. C. A. § 546 (2)
(Supp. 1938), stockholders probably do not have provable claims except under § 307 (1),
52 STAT. 9o6, ii U. S. C. A. § 707 (I) (Supp. 1938).
17o. It is not made clear whether the old corporation may remain in existence, or
whether a new one may be organized. There is no provision for the issuance of new
stock. Compare the detailed sections on these matters in Chapter X, dealing with cor-
porate reorganizations. §§ 197, 203, 210, 211, 216 (8) (II) (12), 52 STAT. 893, 894,
895, 896, 897, I U. S. C. A. §§ 597, 603, 61o, 611, 616 (8) (II) (12) (Supp. 1938). See
also Heuston, Corporate Reorganizati'ns under the Chandler Act (1938) 38 CoL. L.
REv. 1g9.
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In the second place, Chapter XI itself seems to encourage the use
of extra-bankruptcy devices. A debtor may attempt a common-law
composition. 1 71  If a few creditors object, or threaten attachments, the
debtor may thwart them by immediately filing a petition under Chapter
XI.1 72 Hence, the threat of the use of this chapter may have the
coercive power of repopularizing common-law compositions. The
cheapness and simplicity of the latter gives added impetus. Of course,
the debtor may utilize a common-law or statutory assignment, and
employ the Chandler Act as a coercive force in the same manner. The
desirability of this procedure, however, seems questionable. 173
The ambiguities of Chapter XI, plus the coercive power it gives a
debtor, however, may together revivify general assignments. In other
words, proceedings under Chapter XI may still be too cumbersome and
expensive. In that event, it may expect the same fate as its predecessors,
Sections 12 and 74.
CONCLUSIONS
From this survey of the evolution and development of composi-
tions, assignments, and arrangements, the following conclusions may
be drawn:
I. The common-law composition is simplest and most economical
of all insolvency devices. Its defects are twofold: (a) the debtor may
have difficulty securing releases from all of his creditors; (b) during
the period in which he is seeking those releases, his assets remain subject
to attachment. The coercive threat of the Chandler Act may give new
life to common-law compositions.
2. The common-law assignment, as such, is a means of immunizing
assets from attachment. It is rendered of little value since it offers no
discharge from obligations to the debtor.
3. The common-law assignment with discharge from assenting
creditors was a desirable and economical device. Its growth was
retarded by statutory regulation and by the difficulty of securing releases
from all creditors.
4. The development of the statutory assignment was in turn threat-
ened by the enactment of federal bankruptcy legislation. It seems
171. It has already been noticed that a debtor may secure acceptances from his
creditors before filing a petition. See Supra note 161. Also, the proceeding is informal
if he secures the assent of all creditors in advance. See supra note 162.
172. Section 67a, 52 STAT. 875, 11 U. S. C. A. § io7a (Supp. 1938), voiding liens
by judicial proceedings within four months of bankruptcy, is made expressly applicable
to proceedings under Chapter XI. See also § 302, 52 STAT. 905, II U. S. C. A. § 702
(Supp. 1938).
173. It would seem unwise to make a statutory assignment because of the expense
involved. Fees of an assignee would only be added to administrative costs of a pro-
ceeding under Chapter XI, thus reducing the amount available for creditors.
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possible, however, even today for a debtor to proceed under state statutes
and to secure valid releases from assenting creditors. Extra-territorial
difficulties make the statutory assignment chiefly valuable only for the
administration of estates which are purely intrastate in nature.
5. Chapter XI of the Chandler Act purports to offer a simplified
and economical means by which a debtor may effectuate an arrangement
with his creditors. Its means of controlling dissenting creditors and its
discharge provisions are most advantageous. If its ambiguities are
ironed out and it fulfills the hope of its creators, the result of such a
simple, feasible procedure may be that the statutory assignment will be
rendered obsolete. On the other hand, if it fails of its purpose, as did
Sections 12 and 74, one may anticipate rejuvenation of the statutory
assignment. The developments in the near future under Chapter XI
will tell the story.
